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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sider first therefore what interest Michael had in this prop-
erty. It may be conceded that if Michael accepted this
conveyance from his brother upon the verbal understand-
ing above set forth, then the conveyance by him to the
appellants would be regarded as made in performance of
such agreement, and would be upheld in equity as not
affected by the statute of frauds.16 ...But such a trust
must be clearly established and the proof in this case falls
far short of what is required."
While the facts of Wilmer v. Dunn and the language of
Collins v. Collins do not parallel exactly the situation of
the instant case, they (along with other Maryland cases)17
point toward a decision of the instant case in accord with
the accepted weight of authority elsewhere. Accordingly,
the instant opinion would have been more helpful had it
explained the general law on the exact point involved
and offered argument as to why it arrives at a result con-
trary thereto.
CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO
PASSENGER RESULTING FROM
THIRD PARTY'S ACT
Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Cook'
Plaintiff was a regular commuter on a train operated by
the defendant company between Edgewood Arsenal and
Baltimore City. The train made the usual stop at the
Biddle Street Station and, while plaintiff was descending
the coach steps to get off, the starting signal sounded and
the train immediately started forward, throwing plaintiff
off the coach steps and down an embankment.
There was no dispute that plaintiff was caused to fall
by the sudden starting of the train before all of the
16 Italics supplied.
17 Many other earlier Maryland cases contain language supporting the
right of the cestui que trust of a secret trust (even of a parol trust subse-
quently performed or properly acknowledged by the trustee) to prevail
over intervening judgment creditors of the trustee. See: Eartsock v.
Russell, 52 Md. 619 (1879) and cases cited therein. While there were
aspects of constructive or resulting trusts present on the facts of some of
the cases, cestuis of such trusts would seem to be in no better position
than the cestuis of the completely performed oral trust in the instant case(see 8upra, n. 5). For other Maryland law implying decision in favor of
the cestui and against the judgment creditor on the facts of the instant
case, compare the defective mortgage cases culminating in Jackson v.
Trust Co., 176 Md. 505, 6 A. (2d) 380 (1939).
126 A. (2d) 384 (Md., 1942).
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passengers had gotten off. The only evidence as to tho
premature sounding of the starting signal was the uncon-
tradicted testimony of a witness that he saw a fellow
passenger "deliberately pull the cord to go ahead," and
then hurry from the train. The flagman of the train testi-
fied that he was on the station platform when he heard
the two blasts of the whistle, which he knew was the start-
ing signal, and that he immediately ran up the steps of the
train and pulled the signal to stop.
All these facts were conceded, and the only question
was whether any of defendant's employees were in any
way negligent in starting the train. The Court held that
there had been no such negligence, and reiterated the gen-
eral rule that "a carrier is liable for acts of misconduct or
improper conduct on the part of its passengers or strangers
resulting in injury to a fellow-passenger only in the event
that the employees of the carrier knew or, in the exercise
of due care, should have known of the imminency of the
tort and failed to prevent the occurrence after a sufficient
opportunity to do so. The general principle is that a car-
rier is not bound to anticipate that a passenger will inten-
tionally meddle or interfere with the machinery of the car
or train and that if he does, he thereby becomes a tres-
passer, for whose acts the carrier is not liable, in the ab-
sence of any negligence on its part."2
This rule has been laid down by a line of decisions in
Maryland, beginning with Tall v. Baltimore Steam-Packet
Co.' In this case, two passengers on the defendant's boat
quarreled in the captain's presence, and one withdrew to
his room, and, without reasonable warning that he would
come back armed, he returned with a pistol and attacked
his former adversary. In spite of the captain's immediate
attempt to stop the accident, the pistol was fired, injuring
another passenger. In a suit by the injured passenger
against the steamboat company, the latter was absolved
of any liability, on the theory that a carrier does not insure
the absolute safety of a passenger against assaults by a
fellow passenger, but is only required to use all available
means to prevent such injury.
In United Railways and Electric Co. v. State, to use of
Deane,4 a passenger on defendant's street car was drunk
and disorderly and was ejected for assaulting an unoffend-
ing passenger, and the conductor afterwards permitted
10 Am. Jur. 259, Sec. 1441.
3 90 Md. 248, 44 A. 1007, 47 L. R. A. 120 (1899).
'93 Md. 619, 49 A. 923, 54 L. R. A. 942, 86 Am. St. Rep. 453 (1901).
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him to re-enter the car, whereupon he assaulted and killed
another passenger. The Railway was found liable for the
passenger's death. This case is distinguishable on its facts
from the Steam-Packet Co. case. In the latter case, the
carrier's employee acted at once to prevent the injury
when its imminence became known; in the Deane case, the
conductor made no such attempt.
The case of Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Rudy' was
an action by a passenger against the railroad company for
injuries received from a bottle thrown by a fellow pas-
senger who, with others, had for a long time been drinking
and behaving in a disorderly manner. The Court, in hold-
ing the carrier liable, emphasized the requirement for a
finding of liability stated in both the Tall and Deane cases,
supra, viz., that "defendant's servants knew, or with proper
care could have known, that the tort was imminent long
enough in advance of its commission to have prevented it."
In Hagerstown and Frederick Railway Company v.
State, for the use of Cunningham," and in Pugh v. Wash-
ington Railway and Electric Company,7 it was pointed out
that, although a carrier of passengers is bound to the high-
est degree of care, it is not an insurer of the absolute safety
of its passengers.
In all the Maryland cases just reviewed, the injury was
inflicted by the third person's direct assault. The prin-
cipal case seems to be the first in Maryland where the
injury, though proximately caused by a third person's act,
was not the result of a personal assault by such person.
The cases of other jurisdictions indicate that the carrier
is not liable in either case. In New York, in Ferry v.
Manhattan R. Co.," it was held that the carrier was not
liable for injuries received by a passenger, while stepping
from the car to the station platform, because of the prema-
ture starting of the train, if the starting signal was given
by another passenger who, according to some of the evi-
dence, grabbed the bell rope to steady himself. In Penn-
sylvania in Cohen v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,9 it
was held that a carrier is not liable to a passenger who is
injured, while boarding a car, by the premature starting
of the car by an unauthorized fellow passenger.
118 Md. 42, 65, 84 A. 241 (1912).6129 Md. 318, 99 A. 376 (1916).
7138 Md. 226, 113 A. 732 (1921).
8 118 N. Y. 497, 23 N. E. 822 (1890).
9 228 Pa. 243, 77 A. 500 (1910).
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In California, in Cary v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., ° a street
car company was held not liable for injury to a passenger,
who is in the act of alighting from the car, caused by the
sudden starting of the car in response to a signal given by
a fellow passenger, where neither conductor nor motor-
man had any reason to believe that the passenger would
give the signal."
In Massachusetts, the carrier was held liable where a
passenger was injured while alighting from a street car
which started prematurely on a signal given by another
passenger, and it appeared that the same passenger had
also given the stopping signal, and that, to the conductor's
knowledge, passengers sometimes took it upon themselves
to give signals.1'2
In the principal case, the Court discussed at some length
the question of the engineer's negligence in obeying the
proper signals to go forward. It was pointed out that he
was an "extra" taking the regular engineer's place, and
was not familiar with the length of time required to dis-
charge passengers at the particular station where the
plaintiff was injured. The Court concluded that, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances (and there were
none here) the engineer had a perfect right to assume that
a signal, when it is one in universal use, was properly given
by one with authority to give it. This finding agrees with
the views of other jurisdictions. Thus, in Wagner v. New
York City R. Co.'8 it was held that negligence of an electric
street railway could not be predicated upon the unauthor-
ized act of a passenger in signaling the motorman to start
the car, while another passenger was in the act of alight-
ing, and that the motorman, in receiving the signal and
starting the car, was not guilty of negligence. It should
be noted, however, that in such a set of facts the carrier
is liable if the conductor in charge of the car could, by
the exercise of due care and diligence, have countermanded
the unauthorized signal in time to have prevented the mov-
ing of the car and the resulting injury.
Contrary to popular misbelief, the carrier is not an
absolute insurer of the safety of its passengers. The mere
fact that a passenger on a carrier is injured does not of
10 157 Cal. 599, 108 P. 682, 27 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 764, 21 Ann. Cas. 1329
(1910).
11 According to the note in 27 L. R. A. (N. 9.) 764, this position is sup-
ported by all of the authorities which have passed upon the question.
"Nichols v. Lynn and B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 528, 47 N. E. 427 (1897).
"107 N. Y. Supp. 807 (1907) ; see also supra, circa notes 8-11.
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itself raise a presumption of negligence in the carrier. Res
ipsa loquitur will, of course, apply where the passenger's
injury results from some abnormal condition of actual
transportation, and then the carrier will be liable unless it
can show that the abnormal condition, such as a broken
axle or a defective coach step, proceeded from some source
such as unavoidable accident or vis major and is not at-
tributable to the carrier's own acts. 4 But res ipsa loquitur
will not apply where the evidence shows that the injury
to the passenger might have been caused by other things
than the carrier's negligence. Thus, in Tittlebaum v.
Pennsylvania R. Co.,'- in an action against a carrier for
injuries caused a passenger by pieces of glass which struck
her when a car window was broken, it was held "that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable, and that
plaintiff had the burden of showing negligence on defend-
ant's part, there being no evidence of any defect in the
window or that the accident resulted from any misfeasance
of defendant or its employees, or from the passing of a
train, and there being evidence that it was caused by a
stone thrown by a boy who was in no way connected with
defendant." Of more difficulty on the res ipsa loquitur
point is the problem of whether the presumption of negli-
gence, once raised, requires the issue of the carrier's negli-
gence to go to the jury, notwithstanding uncontradicted
evidence negativing negligence.16
But discussion should not go too far beyond the scope
of the instant case, which is but a correct application of
normal rules to a fact situation new for Maryland.
14 Western Md. R. Co. v. Shivers, 101 Md. 391, 61 A. 618 (1905) ; and
other cases.
15 167 Md. 397, 174 A. 89 (1934) ; and other Maryland cases.1 6Thomsen, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Res Ipsa Loquitur
Cases in Maryland (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 285, 302; and Note, Presumption
From Derailment as Requiring Submission of Carrier's Negligence to Jury
in Action by Passenger, Notwithstanding Uncontradicted Evidence Nega-
tiving Negligence (1923) 23 A. L. R. 1214.
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